r Some questions about brain-based mind reading in forensic psychiatry
from neuroimaging and what we can ascertain about the mind from this activity need to be addressed before exploring the ethical and legal implications of BMR. I focus on the presumed potential of these techniques to reveal the content of a defendant's mind at the time of a criminal act and how this might influence a judgement about his capacity or incapacity at that time.
Currently, the most advanced form of imaging for assessing reasoning and decision making is fMRI. By displaying activity in brain regions that correlates with cognitive and emotional processing, this technique may contribute to an explanation of a defendant's behavior. Yet imaging data alone cannot provide such an explanation because correlation is not causation. There is no conclusive evidence to support the claim that a particular pattern of brain activity directly causes a particular action. What imaging can disclose about brain function is itself fraught with uncertainty. The blood oxygenation level-dependent signal in fMRI measures hemodynamic changes, not changes in neural activity. 2 Blood flow usually lags several seconds behind the neural activity that produces it and thus is not a direct measure of this activity. There are also problems with the signal-to-noise ratio in fMRI. This is a measure of how much relevant information (signal) is corrupted by junk information (noise). The ratio is too low in a single scan for it to have any neurophysiological value. To have statistical significance, fMRI scans must be averaged over many brains. Images from fMRI, or positron emission tomography (PET) scans measuring glucose metabolism in the brain, are more accurately described as scientific constructs than indices of real-time neural activity. There is an inferential distance between imaging data and claims about what actually occurs in the brain. 3 A recent meta-analysis of fMRI studies indicates that this inferential distance may be substantial given flaws in the interpretation of information from brain imaging. The analysis showed a false positive rate of up to 70% among researchers interpreting data from fMRI results. 4 Most psychiatrists lack the requisite expertise in cognitive neuroscience to interpret imaging data as evidence of brain function or dysfunction. They rely on interpretations from neuroscientists of the empirical significance of this data. Yet even among neuroscientists, the interpretive process is not entirely empirical but at least partly normative. They must agree on how the data should be collected and interpreted, and this can influence how they explain neurobiology and neurophysiology to forensic psychiatrists. 5 There may be disagreement among neuroscientists about the data resulting in situations where there is no consensus about the meaning of a brain scan or series of scans.
A second type of inferential distance is between empirical data about the brain and normative assessments of criminal behavior. Unless mental states can be explained entirely in terms of brain states, and that the disorders included in forensic psychiatry are just disorders of the brain, there will be an explanatory gap between assessments of brain activity and assessments of a defendant's mental capacity when she committed a crime. 6 Given these two types of inferential distance, a forensic psychiatric assessment of a defendant's behavior based on neuroimaging alone will be inconclusive.
It is not clear whether Meynen adopts a reductive or non-reductive materialist model of the brain-mind relation in his analysis of BMR. 7 In discussing one type of this technique, he says that 'it detects the contents of the mind (or brain) as such' (p. 7). This suggests an ontological and explanatory reduction of mind to brain. If advanced BMR could detect actual brain function, and if the mind just is the brain, then presumably it could read a defendant's mind and confirm that he had or lacked the capacity necessary to reason and control his behavior at the time of a crime. Consistent with reductive materialism, mental functions could be completely explained in terms of neural functions. Elsewhere, he says that 'Psychiatric disorders are mental disorders, in which subjective experiences are the core of the disorder and the diagnostic process' (p. 3). The phenomenology of auditory hallucinations in the positive subtype of schizophrenia, what it is like to hear them, cannot be explained in physical terms of brain function or dysfunction. These voices are traceable to dysfunctional frontal-temporal-parietal connectivity and reduced gray matter volume in these regions and thus traceable to a disordered brain. Nevertheless, the cognitive and emotional impairment associated with psychosis is symptomatic of a disordered mind. Because of psychotic and nonpsychotic psychopathology, schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, major depression, and other psychiatric disorders are not simply disorders of the brain but disorders of the brain and mind as interacting and interdependent aspects of a person. While the characteristic symptoms of these disorders emerge from dysfunction at the neural level, they cannot be completely reduced to neural dysfunction. This suggests a nonreductive materialism for understanding psychiatric disorders and their assessment in forensic psychiatry. It also suggests that imaging displaying patterns of disturbed information processing in the brain will not satisfactorily explain whether a defendant was capable or incapable of controlling his behavior at the time of a crime.
Meynen cites the hypothetical example of a defendant who 'may claim that he almost constantly hears commanding voices-that made him commit a terrible crime-and that he is actually hearing them right now' (p.12). The cognitive impairment associated with the auditory hallucinations would theoretically excuse the defendant from criminal responsibility for the crime. The impairment could be traced to dysfunction in regions of his brain mediating the cognitive capacity to reason and make decisions. Meynen claims that 'this phenomenon will be detected (if the technique works properly)'. Moreover, 'this finding is helpful in diagnosing the defendant's condition' and 'provides information about the actual psychopathological phenomena the patient is experiencing' (p. 12). Even if BMR revealed the neural dysfunction underlying the psychopathology, it would not detect the phenomenology of hearing voices because neither the phenomenology nor the voices are brain states. The voices emerge from disruption of information in the brain but are not identical to this information or its disruption. Emotional impairment is one of the defining features of major depression and the negative subtype of schizophrenia. As in his analysis of auditory hallucinations, Meynen seems to conflate the neural correlates of emotional impairment and the subjective experience of emotional impairment. He cites a study by Marcel Just and co-authors in which they purportedly 'succeeded in identifying emotions based on fMRI scanning' (p. 7). These scans do not identify emotions, only the neural correlates of emotions. Similarly, in the case of a defendant with schizophrenia, a BMR technique could not detect voices but the neural dysfunction underlying the subjective experience of hearing voices. Equally important, detection of neural dysfunction alone would not confirm that the defendant had the mental capacity to refrain from performing the criminal act. His behavior at the time of the action would be the most reliable form of evidence for whether he had or lacked the capacity to be responsible for or excused from responsibility for it. 8 The data from BMR alone would not establish whether he met the criteria of legal insanity. If the behavioral evidence was ambiguous, then the information about the brain detected by BMR could help to clarify questions about capacity and control. But the imaging technique alone would not establish this because the mental capacity in terms of which one is or is not criminally responsible for an action is more than a function of information in one's brain.
Meynen acknowledges that a BMR technique showing that 'a defendant is currently hearing voices does not prove that he heard them at the time of the crime' (p. 12). Yet he adds that it 'may increase the likelihood that he experienced such voices at the time of the crime, which may be relevant for a judgment about his legal insanity ...' (p. 18). In both healthy and diseased brains, intrinsic neural activity may change between the earlier time when the defendant committed a crime and the later time when his brain was scanned. Since neural activity can change, properly functioning BMR could detect different levels of activity, which could influence different assessments of the defendant's mental capacity at the different times. Unless the brain dysfunction was severe and constant, BMR would not determine whether he had or lacked the capacity, or whether he had some degree of capacity but failed to exercise it when he committed the crime. Psychosis can relapse and remit depending on changes in the brain as well as whether the affected person is on or off antipsychotic medication. In addition, environmental stimuli unique to contextual features surrounding the crime could have influenced the defendant's brain and behavior. BMR used even days after a crime could not replicate these stimuli and features or their effects in the brain. Meynen points out that, 'In some legal cases, brain scans of tumors, traumas and neurodegenerative diseases have already played a role, though their interpretation may still be a puzzle, especially as far as the legal consequences are concerned' (pp. 9-10). 'Puzzle' appropriately captures the uncertainty about the legal significance of brain abnormalities detected by structural and functional neuroimaging. This is not only because of the problem of drawing inferences from empirical judgements about imaging data to normative judgements about a person's behavior but also because of probable disagreement within the neuroscience community about the empirical significance of brain scans. The more general upshot of these considerations is that factors both inside and outside of the brain can influence a person's behavior and legal assessments of it. Because BMR could only detect the first set of these factors, and because the empirical significance of these factors could be open to different interpretations, the technique would probably have limited diagnostic and predictive value in the criminal law.
Nevertheless, if psychiatric disorders are just disorders of the brain, then future brain imaging techniques like BMR could yield a better understanding of them as well as how they might lead to criminal behavior. This could mark a major advance in forensic psychiatry. But this would explain away the experiential aspect of the psychopathology of these disorders and its critical role in diagnosis and treatment. It might also explain away the cognitive and control criteria in the insanity defense and criminal responsibility judgements in general. These are psychological rather than neural criteria. On the other hand, if the disorders associated with criminal behavior involve mental as well as neural disturbances, and if the mental is not reducible to the neural, then future BMR may not result in a significant change in forensic psychiatry. It may not tell us any more about the content of a defendant's mental states than current structural and functional brain imaging techniques such as computed tomography (CT), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), PET, and fMRI.
Analyzing data from 16 imaging studies, in 2009 cognitive neuroscientist Martha Farah and co-authors stated that 'the use of imaging to gather information about an individual's psychological traits is already possible, but to an extremely limited extent'.
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One example is activation of limbic regions in research subjects shown faces of people from different racial groups while undergoing fMRI. Depending on the level of activation, this information about the brain might suggest racial bias. Even if the scans confirmed such bias, however, they could not predict that this would manifest in harmful behavior toward others. Has brain imaging technology progressed, or will it progress, to the point where it can read minds to not just a limited but great extent? Will this help to resolve the question of whether a defendant had rational capacity and control of her behavior when she committed a criminal act?
Mind reading would consist in detecting the content of mental states. This would include a person's subjective experience and the actual and possible states of affairs that are the abstract objects of her desires, beliefs, intentions, and other conscious and unconscious states. In psychiatric disorders, there is a distortion in the person's perception of these objects and her overall experience. While this psychopathology is traceable to brain dysfunction, it is not located in the brain. Since imaging detects brain function but not also mental function, it is doubtful that a BMR technique could read minds in any plausible sense of the term. A defendant's behavior at the time of a crime would be the most reliable indicator of his mental capacity at that time. BMR could help to clarify questions about capacity and control by clarifying correlations between a disordered brain and a disordered mind. Again, though, correlation is not causation, and therefore appeal to brain imaging data alone will not resolve these questions. At most, BMR would supplement rather than supplant behavioral criteria as the most reliable evidence of whether the defendant had the relevant mental capacity when she acted.
It is possible that in the future BMR will not only detect real-time brain activity but also offer convincing evidence for reductive materialism and the claim that the mind just is the brain. It that case, BMR could read both brains and minds because the first
